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ALTHOUGH MOST ECONOMISTS  agree that inflation  is costly, there is no 
consensus  about  why. Many  traditionally  cited  costs, such  as deadweight 
loss from the inflation  "tax," seem too small to justify concern about 
moderate  inflation.  One approach  is to argue  that inflation  of 10  percent 
or 15 percent would not be particularly  costly if it were constant and 
fully anticipated,  but  that  a rise in the level of inflation  raises  uncertainty 
about  future  inflation.  In the absence of perfect  indexation,  such uncer- 
tainty has significant  costs, including  arbitrary  redistributions,  relative 
price variation,  and  fewer long-term  contracts, such as loans to finance 
investment.  I 
This view implies that understanding  the costs of inflation  requires 
that we understand  the connection between the level of inflation  and 
uncertainty.  The idea that high inflation  leads to greater  uncertainty  is 
suggested in Arthur  Okun's "The Mirage  of Steady Inflation"  and in 
Milton Friedman's  Nobel lecture, and many economists treat it as a 
stylized  fact.2  But empirical  studies of the inflation-uncertainty  relation 
report  conflicting  results, and the issue appears  unsettled. 
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1. For  discussions  of the costs of inflation  uncertainty,  see Jaffee  and  Kleiman  (1977) 
and  Fischer  and  Modigliani  (1978). 
2. Okun  (1971);  M. Friedman  (1977). 
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To try to resolve the empirical  stand-off,  we focus on the distinction 
between  short-term  and  long-term  uncertainty-that is, uncertainty  over 
different horizons. The experience of many countries fits a  simple 
statistical model in which there are both permanent  and temporary 
shocks to inflation.  Permanent  shocks are shifts in trend inflation,  and 
temporary  shocks are fluctuations  around  the trend. Uncertainty  about 
next quarter's  inflation  depends mainly on the variance of temporary 
shocks, while uncertainty  about inflation  over several years depends 
mainly  on the variance  of permanent  shocks. Our  central  finding  is that 
the level of inflation has a much stronger effect on the variance of 
permanent  shocks than  on the variance  of temporary  shocks, and  thus a 
stronger  effect on uncertainty  at long horizons. 
This finding has several important  implications. First, it helps to 
reconcile the divergent  results of previous studies. Whether  analysts 
find an inflation-uncertainty  link depends largely on the horizons they 
consider. Second, the finding helps distinguish between alternative 
explanations  for the inflation-uncertainty  relation. Because permanent 
changes in inflation involve changes in monetary policy, the finding 
supports  the arguments  of Okun,  Friedman,  and  others  that  high  inflation 
makes policy less stable. Third,  the finding  sharpens  our understanding 
of the costs of inflation.  Most of the costs of uncertainty  about  inflation, 
such as added risk in long-term contracts, involve uncertainty over 
several years or more. Thus our conclusion that high inflation  raises 
long-term  uncertainty  strengthens  the case for policymakers  to keep 
inflation  low. 
We have several related  findings.  The first concerns the distinction 
between  inflation  variability  and  inflation  uncertainty-between  the 
variance of  changes in inflation and the variance of unanticipated 
changes. We find  no evidence for Stanley  Fischer's suggestion  that  high 
inflation  raises variability  but not uncertainty;  instead, it raises both.3 
Second, the inflation-uncertainty  relation  across countries  differs  from 
the relation  over time in a given country. Across countries, short-term 
as well as long-term  uncertainty  rises with average  inflation.  Finally,  the 
inflation-uncertainty  relation in countries with very high inflation is 
similar  to the relation  in moderate-inflation  countries,  though  somewhat 
stronger. 
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Explanations  for the Inflation-Uncertainty  Relation 
To review  alternative  explanations  for a relation  between  inflation  and 
uncertainty,  we focus on the  following  question.  Consider  two moderate- 
inflation  economies-either  different countries or the same country 
during  different  periods-with different  trend  rates  of inflation,  one high 
and one low. Is uncertainty  about inflation-the  variance of errors in 
optimal  forecasts-higher in the economy with the higher  trend? 
We assume  that  trend  inflation  is determined  by trend  money growth, 
and  that  inflation  varies around  its trend  because of monetary  and other 
demand  and supply shocks. In this framework,  there are two reasons 
for inflation  uncertainty  to be high  when the trend  is high. First, inflation 
might  vary more  around  its trend  when the trend  is high. Second, a high 
trend  might  imply  that the trend  itself is less stable. These explanations 
have different  implications  for the horizon over which inflation  raises 
uncertainty.  We discuss the two explanations  in turn. 
Why might inflation  vary more around  its trend when the trend is 
high?  The answer is not obvious, but several authors  present models 
with this property.  In some models, an exogenous rise in trend  inflation 
causes greater variability. Joel Hasbrouck, for example, argues that 
individuals  adjust  their  cash balances  more  frequently  at high inflation. 
The implication  is that  money  demand  responds  more  quickly  to shocks, 
which causes inflation  to vary more. Ball, Gregory  Mankiw,  and David 
Romer  argue  that  high  trend  inflation  reduces nominal  price  rigidity  and 
thus steepens the short-run Phillips curve. As  a result, shocks to 
aggregate  demand  have smaller  effects on output but larger  effects on 
inflation.4 
Alex Cukierman  and Allan Meltzer, as well as Michael Devereux, 
derive links between trend inflation  and fluctuations  around  the trend 
when the trend is endogenous. They use the Barro-Gordon  model of 
"time-consistent" policy,  in which the output effects of monetary 
surprises  tempt  the  Federal  Reserve  into  creating  positive  trend  inflation. 
In both  papers,  a change  that raises inflation  uncertainty  also increases 
the effects of surprises,  which  leads to a higher  trend.  In Cukierman  and 
Meltzer's  paper, the change is an increase in monetary  control errors, 
4. Hasbrouck  (1979);  Ball, Mankiw,  and  Romer  (1988). 218  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1990 
which slows the public's revision of expectations after a surprise. In 
Devereux's paper, the change is an increase in the variance of real 
shocks, which raises the effects of surprises  by decreasing  wage index- 
ation.' 
While these models may have elements of truth, they cannot fully 
capture  the sources of inflation  uncertainty.  In the models, inflation  is 
uncertain  because shocks or control errors  cause it to fluctuate  around 
its trend. In actual economies, inflation  is also uncertain  because the 
trend  itself may change. Because trend  inflation  is determined  by trend 
money growth, shifts in the trend involve a shift in the policy of the 
Federal  Reserve. The Federal  Reserve may  reduce  trend  money growth 
to disinflate, or it may allow the trend to rise to accommodate fiscal 
policy or a supply  shock. 
These possibilities are explored in the second set of theories about 
the inflation-uncertainty  link-theories in which shifts in trend  inflation 
are  more  likely  when the trend  is high.  Drawing  on arguments  by Dennis 
Logue and Thomas  Willett,  Milton  Friedman,  and others, Ball presents 
a model in which trend inflation  is less stable when it is high.6 The 
intuitive idea is simple. In a period of low inflation, such as the early 
1960s  in the United States, the consensus is that policymakers  will try 
to keep inflation  low. Inflation  may arise at some point because the 
Federal Reserve accommodates a shock, but it is unlikely that the 
Federal  Reserve will simply  decide to raise inflation.  In contrast,  when 
trend inflation  is high it is not clear what the Federal Reserve will do, 
because it faces a dilemma: it would like to disinflate, but fears the 
recession that would probably  result. It is likely that disinflation  will 
occur eventually, but the timing  is uncertain.  For example, in the late 
1970s,  it would  have been difficult  to predict  the exact onset of the sharp 
disinflation of  1981-82. Ball formalizes this idea by assuming that 
policymakers  differ  in their  views of the relative  costs of unemployment 
and  inflation  and  thus of the desirability  of disinflation.  When  inflation  is 
high, the public is uncertain  about future inflation  because it does not 
know which views will prevail. 
In Ball's model, high  inflation  creates  uncertainty  about  disinflation- 
about whether trend inflation  will fall. High trend inflation  might also 
5. Cukierman  and  Meltzer  (1986);  Devereux  (1989);  Barro  and  Gordon  (1983). 
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raise uncertainty  by causing the public to fear that the trend will rise 
further. In "The Mirage of Steady Inflation," Okun describes what 
happens  if policymakers  accept high  inflation  to accommodate  a shock: 
"Would  not such a shift in policy have to be read  as indicative  of future 
action?  Can a government  that shifts its inflation  tolerance  level from 2 
to 5 percent convince anyone that it will vigorously combat 8 percent 
inflation  in the event of unforeseen  excess demand  or another  unfavor- 
able surprise  in the Phillips  curve? . ..  [A] decision to live with inflation 
would  trigger  off expectations  of larger  and more variable  rates of price 
increase."7 In other words, by accommodating  an inflationary  shock, 
the  Federal  Reserve  signals  a willingness  to accommodate  future  shocks; 
the unpredictability  of future shocks creates uncertainty  about future 
inflation.  In contrast, a nonaccommodative  policy makes it clear that 
the Federal Reserve is committed to keeping inflation  under control. 
Paul Volcker's tough policy in the early eighties made the public more 
confident  that  inflation  would stay low in the mid-eighties. 
These two sets of theories  have different  implications  for the horizon 
over which inflation  raises uncertainty.  If high inflation  implies greater 
fluctuations  around  trend  but does not affect the trend  itself, then it may 
greatly  increase  uncertainty  about  next quarter's  inflation,  but  have little 
effect on long-run  uncertainty.  In contrast,  if high  inflation  implies  a less 
stable trend, then it raises long-run  uncertainty.  It has little effect on 
short-run  uncertainty  assuming  the latter is dominated  by fluctuations 
around  trend.  Our  statistical  model  formalizes  these ideas.8 
Previous Evidence and a First Look at U.S. Data 
The  initial  empirical  evidence  of a link  between  the  level and  variability 
of inflation  is contained in cross-country  studies by Okun, Logue and 
Willett,  Edward  Foster, and others in the 1970s.9  For a given country, 
these authors  compute  the sample  mean  of annual  postwar  inflation  and 
a measure of variability-either the sample variance or the average 
squared  change in inflation.  They find a strong positive cross-country 
7. Okun  (1971,  p. 490). 
8. The distinction  between long-run  and short-run  inflation  uncertainty  is discussed 
by Klein  (1976)  and  by Fischer  (1981).  Fischer  suggests  that  high  inflation  raises  long-run 
uncertainty  by increasing  the likelihood  of a shift  in monetary  policy. 
9. Okun  (1971);  Logue  and  Willett  (1976);  Foster  (1978). 220  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1990 
correlation  between the mean and the measure  of variability-in other 
words, that countries  with high inflation  rates also have more variable 
inflation.  Some studies report  a nonlinear  relation, one that is stronger 
across high- and moderate-inflation  countries than across moderate- 
inflation  countries  only. But  usually  the studies  find  a significant  relation 
over all ranges  of inflation. 
Papers  by Fischer  and  John  Taylor  show that  the positive correlation 
between means and variances holds across time as well as across 
countries.10  Fischer splits postwar U.S. data into three- and five-year 
subperiods  and finds  a positive correlation  across periods. Taylor uses 
ten-year subperiods  for seven OECD countries and achieves similar 
results. 
Unfortunately  for lovers of tidy stylized facts, the most prominent 
inflation-uncertainty  study of the 1980s-Robert Engle's 1983  paper- 
reaches a different  conclusion. Engle estimates a forecasting  equation 
for quarterly  inflation  in the postwar United States. He then uses his 
ARCH  technique  to construct  a time series for the variance  of unantici- 
pated shocks to inflation,  with  the variance  in a given quarter  measuring 
uncertainty about inflation  in the next quarter. Engle finds that the 
variance is uncorrelated  with the current  level of inflation-that high 
inflation  in  one quarter  does not  lead  to greater  uncertainty  about  inflation 
in the next quarter.  In particular,  his variance  estimates  are roughly  the 
same  in the low-inflation  1960s  as in the high-inflation  1970s.  Subsequent 
estimates  of ARCH  models confirm  these findings.  "I 
In trying to reconcile Engle's findings  with other studies, Fischer 
suggests that high inflation  raises inflation  variability  but not inflation 
uncertainty.  That is, when inflation  is high it varies considerably,  but 
the movements are largely forecastable, so unanticipated  changes in 
inflation  are not especially  large.  An obvious and simpler  interpretation, 
however, is that Engle's results differ from earlier ones because he 
considers a much shorter  horizon. Perhaps current  inflation  has little 
effect on variability  (or uncertainty)  over the next quarter,  but a signifi- 
cant effect on variability  over the next five years. Such a finding  could 
explain  the results  of pre-Engle  studies, which  usually  measure  variabil- 
ity over several  years. 
10.  Fischer(1981);Taylor(1981). 
11.  Cosimano and Jansen (1988). Laurence  Ball and Stephen  G. Cecchetti  221 
Taylor's study provides  a piece of evidence that horizons  are impor- 
tant.  For  each  of seven  countries,  Taylor  estimates  a forecasting  equation 
for inflation  and computes the variance of unanticipated  inflation.  He 
finds that the cross-country  relation between mean inflation  and this 
variance  is positive and similar  to the relation  between the mean  and  the 
ordinary  sample  variance.  The  finding  suggests  that  Fischer's  distinction 
between variability  and uncertainty  is not important.  One explanation 
for the difference  between Engle's and  Taylor's  results  is that, although 
both consider uncertainty  about the next period, Engle uses quarterly 
data  and  Taylor  uses annual  data and thus considers  uncertainty  over a 
longer horizon. (Of course other differences  might  explain the results; 
for example, Engle studies  a time series and  Taylor  a cross-section.) 
Another  relevant strand  of research is the work of Benjamin  Klein 
and of Robert Barsky on the persistence of U.S.  inflation.12 As trend 
inflation  has risen over the past 100  years, the persistence  of changes  in 
inflation  has also increased. Barsky, for example, finds that quarterly 
inflation was roughly white noise during 1870-1913, followed auto- 
regressive processes during 1919-38 and 1947-59, and has followed a 
nonstationary  process-so  that changes in inflation  are largely perma- 
nent-since  1960.  As explained  below, for  a  given  variance  of innovations 
in inflation,  greater  persistence  implies  greater  uncertainty  over long  but 
not short horizons. Thus Klein's and Barsky's results support our 
hypothesis  that  a rise in inflation  affects long-run  uncertainty. 
To motivate our own statistical model, we perform  a preliminary 
analysis  of U.S. data for 1954-89. We compute simple  measures  of the 
inflation  level-variability  relation  and ask whether  results are sensitive 
to horizons. Table 1 reports the results of splitting  quarterly  inflation 
data into nonoverlapping  periods and computing the correlation of 
sample  means  and  variances  across periods.  We use seasonally  adjusted 
data on both the implicit GNP deflator and the CPI-U.13 The mean- 
variance  correlation  increases strongly  with the lengths  of periods. For 
the deflator,  the correlation  is 0.18 for one-year  periods. It rises to 0.43 
forfour-year  periods  and  0.94  for ten-year  periods.  The  pattern  is similar 
for the CPI, although the correlations  are somewhat larger for short 
12. Klein  (1976);  Barsky  (1987). 
13. The  data  are  taken  from  Citibase.  For  the CPI-U,  inflation  is the percentage  change 
in the index  from  the last month  of the previous  quarter  to the last month  of the current 
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Table 1.  Subperiod Correlations of Mean and Variance of Inflation, 
United States,  1954-89a 
Correlation 
Length of  Consumer 
subperiods  GNP  price 
in years  deflator  indexb 
1  0.180  0.318 
2  0.309  0.670 
3  0.360  0.629 
4  0.433  0.902 
5  0.772  0.768 
6  0.933  0.848 
7  0.459  0.987 
8  0.825  0.859 
9  0.788  0.969 
10  0.942  0.966 
Source:  Citibase.  Quarterly data, seasonally  adjusted, for implicit GNP deflator and CPI-U for all items. 
a.  Subperiods  are nonoverlapping intervals of indicated length. 
b.  For the CPI-U,  inflation is the percentage  change  in the index from the last month of the previous  quarter to 
the last month of the current quarter. 
periods.(While  suggestive, the results  for 10-year  periods  are imprecise 
because there  are only three  nonoverlapping  observations.) 
Table 2 reports  another  simple measure  of the relation  between the 
level of inflation  and variability:  the correlations  between current  infla- 
tion, ur,,  and the squared  change in inflation  over x quarters  for various 
values of x, (',r,+  -  Tr,)2. Figure 1 plots the correlations  against  x. For 
the GNP deflator,  the correlation  when  x =  1  is 0.09-there  is almost  no 
relation between the level and variability  over the next quarter.  The 
correlation rises as x rises, reaching 0.19-0.42 for x  =  4 to x  =  20 
(roughly  one to five  years  ahead).  At even longer  horizons,  the  correlation 
drops; it is near zero by x  =  40. The CPI results are similar: the 
correlation  is 0.21 for x =  1 and  rises to a peak of 0.60 for x =  18. 
What  explains  the hump-shaped  pattern  of correlations?  The increase 
as x rises from 1 to 20 suggests that the level of inflation  has a stronger 
effect on variability  over several years than over the next quarter,  as 
predicted  by some of the theories  described  above. The  weak  correlation 
at very long horizons suggests that current inflation  is uninformative 
about inflation  in the distant  future. Variability  between 1990  and 2000 
depends  largely  on the level of inflation  in the late 1990s,  which  is difficult 
to predict based on the 1990 level. (Results for long horizons should Laurence  Ball  and Stephen  G. Cecchetti  223 
Table 2.  Correlations of Level and Squared Change in Inflation over Various Horizons, 
United States, 1954-89 
Length  of  Correlation 
horizon  in  GNP 
quarters  (x)  deflator  CPIa 
1  0.086  0.213 
2  0.134  0.395 
3  0.121  0.333 
4  0.192  0.376 
5  0.357  0.412 
6  0.313  0.405 
7  0.304  0.439 
8  0.344  0.447 
9  0.207  0.410 
10  0.303  0.422 
12  0.366  0.470 
14  0.416  0.530 
16  0.282  0.491 
18  0.323  0.602 
20  0.355  0.572 
24  0.211  0.514 
28  0.133  0.396 
32  0.197  0.383 
36  0.201  0.279 
40  0.055  0.162 
44  -  0.005  0.127 
48  -0.071  0.153 
50  -  0.045  0.016 
Source: Same as table  1. The correlations  are between  rr1  and (rrt+,  -  rrt)2 for various horizons,  x. 
a.  See  note b, table  1. 
again be interpreted  cautiously because we have few nonoverlapping 
observations.) 
Comparing  data at different  frequencies  also illuminates  the role of 
forecast horizons. For annual deflator data, the correlation  between 
inflation  and  its squared  change  is 0.22 for  x = 1, compared  with 0.09 for 
quarterly  data. For the CPI, the correlation  for x =  1 is 0.48 for annual 
data, 0.21 for quarterly  data, and 0.10 for monthly data. The level- 
variability  correlation increases monotonically with the length of a 
period.  These  results  increase  our  suspicion  that  the differences  between 
Engle's and Taylor's results are explained by  differences between 
quarterly  and  annual  data. 224  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1990 
Figure  1. Correlations  of Level  and Squared  Change  in Inflation,  Consumer  Price Index 
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Source:  Citibase.  Quarterly data,  seasonally  adjusted,  for  implicit  GNP  deflator  and CPI-U  for  all  items.  The 
correlations are of  nt1  and (rrT+t  -  qrt)2  for various  horizons, x. 
a. See note b, table 1. 
A Statistical Model of Inflation 
This section presents  our  basic statistical  model  and  then shows how 
the model  captures  the inflation-uncertainty  relation  at various  horizons. 
Basic Model 
Engle's approach  to the inflation-uncertainty  link is to estimate a 
forecasting  equation  for inflation  and  look for a relation  between current 
inflation  and the variance of innovations. Unfortunately,  such an ap- 
proach  does not allow us to address  our question. In such a framework, Laurence Ball and Stephen  G. Cecchetti  225 
uncertainty  at any horizon  is proportional  to the variance  of the inno- 
vation. (If, for example, inflation  is a random  walk, then the x-period- 
ahead  forecast variance  equals x times the variance  of the innovation.) 
To the  extent  that  the  level of inflation  affects  the variance  of innovations, 
it has the same proportional  effect on uncertainty  at all horizons. 
To allow  different  inflation-uncertainty  relations  at  different  horizons, 
we consider  a model  with more  than  one kind  of innovation  to inflation. 
Specifically,  we assume that there are both permanent  and temporary 
shocks. For simplicity,  we study a univariate  model (below we experi- 
ment  with a multivariate  approach).  Our  basic model is 
(1)  Xt=  *t  +  6t 
(2)  *.=  *.- 1 +  et, 
where  the temporary  and permanent  shocks,  t and  E, respectively, are 
uncorrelated  white noise. Equations 1-2 are a simple "unobserved 
components"  model. The variable  'rT  is actual  inflation,  and  fr,is "core" 
or "trend" inflation,  which is not directly observable. Trend inflation 
follows a random  walk, and actual inflation  equals trend inflation  plus 
white noise. 
This framework  captures  the broad  kinds of inflation  movements in 
the United States and similar economies. The permanent shock Et 
captures events that change trend inflation.  A negative >, occurs, for 
example,  when the Federal  Reserve creates a recession to disinflate.  A 
positive E,  occurs if, in accommodating  a supply shock, the Federal 
Reserve  allows trend  inflation  to rise. The shock  t  captures  events that 
affect inflation  temporarily  but do not affect the trend, such as supply 
shocks that are not accommodated,  fluctuations  in velocity, and bad 
weather. 
Two features  of our specification  deserve discussion. First, since $T, 
follows a random  walk, inflation  is nonstationary.  That is, there are 
events that permanently shift trend inflation, with no tendency for 
inflation  to revert to a constant mean. Barsky finds that U.S. inflation 
has followed a nonstationary  process since 1960, and statistical tests 
reported  below fail to reject nonstationarity  for most countries in our 
sample.  14  Further,  informal  inspection of inflation  time series suggests 
regimes  with different  trend inflation  rather  than fluctuations  around  a 
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constant mean. On the other hand, tests for nonstationarity  have little 
power against the alternative of  a highly persistent autoregressive 
process-a  process with very slow mean  reversion.  To allow for this, in 
our empirical  work we experiment  with permitting  *r,  to follow a highly 
persistent  AR(1)  process.  This  modification  has  little  effect  on our  results. 
As described  below, the only exceptions are results about uncertainty 
at very long horizons. 
Second,  assumingthat*,rtfollows  arandom  walk,  there  is no  theoretical 
reason that the transitory  shock rp need be white noise. An unaccom- 
modated  supply  shock, for example, might  have effects on inflation  that 
are  initially  large  and  then  die out. In our  empirical  work,  we experiment 
with generalizations  of the model in which  t is serially correlated. 
However, from  the point  of view of simplicity,  we are  fortunate:  we find 
that the great  majority  of countries  and time periods fit our model with 
white noise errors.  Apparently,  deviations  from trend  inflation  consist 
largely  of one-quarter  movements. 
Any unobserved  components  model is observationally  equivalent  to 
an ARIMA model with a single shock. Our model is equivalent to an 
IMA(1,  1) model-that  is, a model in which the change in inflation  is an 
MA(1).  To see this, note that  equations  1 and 2 imply 
(3)  At=  Tt-  =  et  +  (t  -  -I) 
Our  model is equivalent  to an MA(1)  because, since Et  and q, are white 
noise, only the first  autocovariance  of ATrt  is nonzero. Specifically,  our 
model  is equivalent  to the MA(1)  model 
(4)  Ar,=  vt +  ?Ov,_1, 
where"5 
(5)  -2  0Co2 
2=  (1  +  0)2f2V 
The MA coefficient  0 lies between zero and negative  one, which means 
that  a shock to inflation  is partly  reversed  in the next period.  This is true 
on average in our unobserved  components model, because permanent 
15.  To derive equation S  note that equation 3 implies E(A-r)  =  or' + 2U2 andE(A-  rr,,  I) 
=  -  U2 . Equation 4 implies E(An2)  =  (1  +  02)U2  and E(A'r,1&,_  )  =  fk2.  Setting these 
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shocks are never reversed and temporary  shocks are completely re- 
versed.  As the variance  of permanent  shocks  rises  relative  to the  variance 
of temporary  shocks, 0 falls in absolute value-changes  in inflation 
become more  persistent.  16 
In our model, current  trend inflation,  *,rt,  is the optimal  forecast of 
inflation in all future periods, since both changes in the trend and 
deviations  from  trend  are  white  noise. While  *,r  is not  directly  observable, 
it can be inferred  from the history of inflation.17  To study inflation 
uncertainty  at various  horizons,  we compute  the change  in inflation  from 
t to t + x, 'rt  +x -  t, and  the unexpected  change,  rr+X  t  -*,: 
(6)  wt+X  -  ' 
=  (t.+x  -  *t)  +  (t+x  -  t) 
x 
=  E  Et+i  +  t+X  -  Tit, 
(7)  -*t  =  (*r+  -  rXt)  +  Tqt+X 
x 
=Ets+i  +  Tlt+x. 
i=  1  ~X 
Assuming for the moment that the variances of the two shocks are 
constant,  the variances  of these changes  are 
(8)  E(-Tt+x -t)2  =  Xo-2 +  2C2, 
(9)  EQrr,+X  -  -fr)2  =  XCz2 +  C2 
Note that  E(,Tt+x  -  X,)2,  which measures  variability,  and  E(Qr+W  -* 
which measures  uncertainty,  differ  only slightly. If (as in the empirical 
results  below)  C2 exceeds C2, then changes in inflation  over one quarter 
are  dominated  by temporary  shocks. But  for  long  horizons-large values 
of x-changes  are dominated  by permanent  shocks. 
The Level of Inflation and  Uncertainty 
To examine  the effects of trend  inflation  on uncertainty,  assume that 
the variances  of the two shocks depend  on the most recent  level of *,>: 
16. Unobserved  components  models  with serially  correlated  shocks  are  equivalent  to 
more  complex  ARIMA  models. If q, is AR(1),  our model is equivalent  to an ARMA(1,  1) 
for As,. 
17. Beveridge  and Nelson (1981,  pp. 155-58)  show that*i,  = (1 -  0) E ?-? (-0)i7',- . 
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(10)  o2 (t)  =  po  +  3 It-  ; 
(11)  CoE(t)  =  Io ?  8rft-l 
This paper's  basic hypothesis  is that  trend  inflation  has a stronger  effect 
on cr than  on a,,. In terms  of the equivalent  IMA(1,  1)  model, a high  trend 
makes changes in inflation  more persistent. A strong effect of trend 
inflation  on Cr means that the trend is less stable when it is high-as 
suggested  by Okun  and Ball, high inflation  makes the Federal Reserve 
more  likely  to disinflate  or to allow  inflation  to rise  further.  A weak effect 
on a,, means that high inflation  does not  greatly increase monetary 
control errors, fluctuations in money demand, or other sources of 
temporary  movements  in inflation. 
If our hypothesis  is true, then it explains  our preliminary  finding  that 
inflation  has larger  effects on uncertainty  at longer  horizons.  To see this, 
substitute  equations 10 and 11 into equation  9 to compute uncertainty 
about  inflation  conditional  on the current  trend: 
(12)  E[('rrt+x  -  frt)2[$t]  =x(PO +  P3*ft)  +  (80  +  81 rft) 
(The variances of future shocks conditional  on *,rt  are the same as the 
variances of current  shocks, because the best forecast of future *a's  is 
the current  *a.)  The effect of an increase  in *,r  is given by 
(13)  =  -frt)  I*r]  -  Xp  +  81. 
ditr 
If PI is large and 81  is small-*,  has a larger  effect on the variance  of 
permanent  shocks-then  *,r  has a much larger  effect on uncertainty  at 
long horizons. 
Main Results 
Here we  present our main empirical findings. We estimate our 
statistical  model  and  examine  the relations  between the level of inflation 
and the variances  of the two shocks. We estimate these relations  both 
across countries and over time, and we consider both moderate-  and 
high-inflation  countries. 
In principle,  one could estimate  our model with a time series for one 
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equations 10-11. This approach  would produce estimates of PI  and 81, 
the effects of *,r  on the variances.18 The econometrics  of this approach 
are complicated,  however, and so we leave it for future  work. Here we 
proceed in two simpler  ways. First, we assume that the two variances 
are constant  for a given country  and  estimate  the cross-country  relation 
between the variances  and average inflation. Second, we divide each 
country's  data into five-year  periods  and estimate the relation  between 
the variances  and  average  inflation  across periods. 
We use quarterly,  seasonally  adjusted  data  on the CPI  and either  the 
GNP or the GDP deflator.19  The CPI data, from the International 
Monetary Fund's InternationalFinancial  Statistics and the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation  and Development, cover 40 countries. The 
deflator  data, from  the OECD, cover 9 countries. For each country  we 
use data  from 1960:2  (or the beginning  of the sample,  where  that  is later) 
to the most recent quarter  available  (usually 1989:  1). When we divide 
the data  into five-year  periods, we have six periods  beginning  in 1984:2, 
1979:2,  and so on.20 
Table 3 lists the countries in our sample and, for each country, the 
years for which data are available.  The table also shows the means and 
simple standard  deviations of quarterly  inflation. The countries vary 
widely in their  inflation  experiences. Average quarterly  inflation  is less 
than 2 percent in many European  and North American  countries, but 
exceeds 10  percent  in Israel  and several South  American  countries. 
Before estimating  our model, we check whether it fits the data. For 
38 of 40 countries,  Dickey-Fuller  tests on CPI  data  fail to reject  at the 10 
percent level our assumption  that inflation  is nonstationary.21 To test 
our  assumption  that  both permanent  and  temporary  inflation  shocks are 
white noise, we compare the implied  MA(1) model for &Tr,  with more 
18. See Evans (1989)  for a related  approach  to measuring  time variation  in short-run 
and  long-run  inflation  uncertainty. 
19. The deflator  data  are seasonally  adjusted  by the OECD.  We seasonally  adjust  the 
CPI by regressing  unadjusted  quarterly  inflation  on quarter  dummies and using the 
residuals. 
20. The  first  period  is four  years  (1960:2  to 1964:1).  In addition,  because  the beginning 
and  end of the sample  vary across countries,  we sometimes  have data  for only part  of a 
period.  We include  a period  for a given country  if we have inflation  data for at least 12 
quarters. 
21. We perform  the augmented  Dickey-Fuller  tests described  in section 5 of Dickey 
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Table 3.  Quarterly Inflation, Mean and Standard Deviation, Sample of 40 Countries, 
1960-89 
Consulmer  price index  GNP deflator 
Mean  Standard  Mean  Standard 
Country  Sample  inflation deviation  Sample  inflation deviation 
Argentinaa  1970:1 to  1987:4  28.96  562.48  ...  ... 
Australia  1960:1 to  1988:4  1.69  1.19  1960:1  to 1988:4b  1.79  1.35 
Austria  1960:1 to  1989:1  1.11  1.31  ..  .  ... 
Belgium  1960:1 to  1989:2  1.22  0.96  ...  ...  ... 
Boliviaa  1970:1 to  1987:4  29.67  5,090.38  .  .  ..  . 
Brazila  1964:1 to  1988:2  15.64  381.37  ...  ...  ... 
Canada  1960:1 to  1989:1  1.36  0.89  1961:1 to  1989:1  1.39  0.90 
Chilea  1970:1 to  1987:4  16.30  416.21  ...  ... 
Colombiaa  1964:1 to  1988:2  4.35  7.59  ...  ... 
Denmark  1960:1 to  1989:1  1.79  1.27  ...  .... 
Dominican  Republica  1964:1 to  1987:3  2.28  10.97  ...  ...  ... 
Ecuadora  1964:1 to  1988:2  2.59  6.64  ...  ...  ... 
El Salvadora  1964:1 to  1988:2  3.79  12.82  ...  ...  ... 
Finland  1960:1 to  1989:1  1.87  1.78  ...  .... 
France  1960:1 to  1989:1  1.64  1.02  1971:1  to 1988:4b  2.06  0.88 
Great Britain  1960:1 to  1989:1  1.94  1.54  1960:1  to 1989:lb  1.98  1.63 
Greece  1960:1 to  1989:1  2.71  2.42  ...  ... 
Guatemalaa  1964:1 to  1987:4  2.00  11.92  ...  ... 
Ireland  1960:1 to  1988:4  2.16  1.77  ...  .... 
Israela  1964:1 to  1988:2  11.50  190.92  ...  ...  . 
Italy  1960:1 to  1989:1  2.22  1.58  1960:1  to 1988:2b  2.38  1.66 
Jamaicaa  1964:1 to  1988:2  3.14  9.58  ...  ... 
Japan  1960:1 to  1989:1  1.39  1.43  1965:1 to  1989:1  1.18  1.24 
Luxembourg  1960:1 to  1989:1  1.12  0.93  ...  ...  ... 
Mexicoa  1964:1  to 1988:2  7.05  60.45  . .  .  .  .. 
Netherlands  1960:1 to  1989:1  1.14  1.05  ...  ... 
New  Zealand  1960:1 to  1984:2  2.08  1.38  ...  ... 
Norway  1960:1 to  1989:1  1.68  1.60  ...  .... 
PerUa  1964:1 to  1988:1  9.97  91.55  ...  ... 
Philippinesa  1964:1 to  1988:2  2.99  11.70  ...  ...  ... 
Portugal  1960:1 to  1989:1  3.10  2.81  ...  ...  ... 
Singaporea  1968:1 to  1988:2  0.99  4.76  ...  ...  ... 
South Africaa  1964:1 to  1988:2  2.42  1.84  ...  ...  ... 
Spain  1960:1 to  1989:1  2.44  1.82  ...  ...  ... 
Sweden  1960:1 to  1989:1  1.65  1.10  ...  ...  ... 
Switzerland  1960:1 to  1989:1  0.95  0.85  1967:1  to 1989:lb  1.11  1.09 
Turkey  1960:1 to  1989:1  6.15  7.10  ...  ...  ... 
United  States  1960:1 to  1989:1  1.24  0.92  1960:1 to  1989:1  1.22  0.72 
Venezuelaa  1964:1 to  1988:2  2.12  5.13  ...  ...  ... 
West Germany  1960:1 to  1989:1  0.87  0.66  1960:1 to  1989:1  0.98  0.79 
Sources:  Data for countries  in Central and South America,  the Caribbean, Israel, the Philippines,  Singapore,  and 
South Africa are from International Monetary Fund, International  Finiancial  Statistics,  spliced from tape and various 
editions.  All other data are from OECD,  Maini  Econonmic  Itndicators,  1989 edition.  Data are quarterly and seasonally 
adjusted. 
a.  IMF data. 
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general  models. For each country  we estimate all ARMA(p, q) models 
for p c  2 and 0 <  q c  2 and choose among them using the Schwarz 
criterion  (which maximizes the likelihood function with penalties for 
extra parameters).22  We choose an MA(1)  in 32 of 40 cases for the CPI 
and 5 of 9 cases for deflators;  the other countries are mainly MA(2). 
Finally,  for U.S. data we use the same procedure  to choose models for 
As,rt  in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. For deflator data, the Schwarz 
criterion  chooses an MA(1)  for all three periods;  for the CPI, it chooses 
an MA(1)  for the 1970s and 1980s and an MA(2) for the 1960s. These 
results suggest that our model is a good approximation  to the behavior 
of inflation  in a wide range of circumstances.  For simplicity, our main 
analysis  assumes that our model always holds, but we experiment  with 
relaxing  this assumption.23 
For a given country  or period, we estimate the variances  of the two 
errors  in equations  1 and  2 by maximum  likelihood.  Specifically,  we use 
the approach  of Andrew  Harvey  to estimate  an MA(1)  model  for Awrt  and 
then use equation  5 to work  back to the two variances.24 
We  begin  by considering  the experience  of the United States. We then 
extend the analysis to a  sample of 28 moderate-inflation  countries 
(average  quarterly  inflation  below 3 percent).  For this sample,  we check 
the robustness of our results as well as estimating the basic model. 
Finally, we ask whether the results extend to the  12 high-inflation 
countries  in our data set. 
The United States 
For U.S. CPI  data,  figure  2 plots average  inflation  for the six five-year 
periods against our estimates of the standard  deviations of the two 
shocks. For both the CPI and the GNP deflator, table 4 reports the 
22. Schwarz  (1978)  suggests  minimizing  - 21n  2  + (p + q)lnT,  where  2 is the  likelihood 
value for the model, T is the sample size, and p and q are the number  of AR and MA 
parameters,  respectively. 
23. We also investigate  the possibility that there are regime shifts in inflation  that 
cannot  be captured  by an ARIMA  model. We consider  a process switching  model with 
both  normal  and  extraordinary  shocks  to inflation;  see, for  example,  Friedman  and  Laibson 
(1989)  and  Cecchetti,  Lam, and  Mark  (1990).  Such a model  would  be indicated  by excess 
kurtosis  in the distribution  of changes  in inflation.  Diagnostic  tests on U.S. data provide 
no evidence  of excess kurtosis. 
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Figure 2.  Average Inflation and the Standard Deviations of Permanent and Temporary 
Shocks, Consumer Price Index, United States, Five-Year Periods,  1960-89 
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Source:  OECD,  Main Economic  Indicators  (see  table 3). Subperiods are divided into five-year periods as follows: 
1960:2-1964: 1; 1964:2-1969: 1; 1969:2-1974: 1; 1974:2-1979: 1; 1979:2-1984: 1; 1984:2-1989: 1. Laurence Ball and Stephen  G. Cecchetti  233 
Table 4.  Effects of Average Inflation on the Standard Deviations of Permanent 
and Temporary Shocks, United States, Five-year Periods,  1960:2-1989:1 
Coefficient 
on average 
Dependent  variable  inflation  R2 
Consumer  price index 
Permanent  shock (crj  0.230  0.897 
(10.80) 
Temporary  shock  (cra)  0.081  0.137 
(0.88) 
GNP deflator 
Permanent  shock (a)  0.159  0.864 
(6.87) 
Temporary shock (v,,)  -  0.005  0.001 
(-0.07) 
Source:  OECD,  Main Ecotionoic Indicators.  Numbers  in parentheses  are t-statistics. 
results of simple regressions of each standard  deviation on average 
inflation  (with heteroskedasticity-consistent  standard  errors). Experi- 
mentation  shows that linear  relations  between the standard  deviations 
and  average  inflation  fit  better  than  ones between variances  and  average 
inflation. 
Although  our regressions  use only six observations, the results are 
clear. For both the CPI and the deflator,  the effect of average  inflation 
on the standard  deviation of permanent  shocks is positive and highly 
significant.  Indeed, the R2's are close to 0.9: differences in average 
inflation  explain almost all the variation  in  ,e. In contrast, there is no 
evidence that average  inflation  affects o-,: the coefficient estimates are 
small  and  the t-statistics  are less than  one. 
It is interesting  to examine the details of the U.S.  experience. As 
shown  in figure  2, high  average  inflation  in 1979-83  was accompanied  by 
large variance in both the permanent  and temporary  components of 
inflation.  The former  is likely explained  by the Volcker  disinflation  and 
the  latter  by fluctuations  in food and  energy  prices.25  The two other  high- 
inflation  periods, 1969-73 and 1974-78, also have large permanent 
25. Blinder  (1982). 234  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1990 
shocks. Likely culprits include disinflations  begun in December 1968 
and April 1974, and the Federal  Reserve's inflationary  response to the 
1975 recession.26  In these two periods, however, the variances of 
temporary  shocks are  fairly  low. There  were larger  temporary  shocks in 
the low-inflation  periods  of 1960-63  and 1984-89.  In those periods,  trend 
inflation  was stable, but short-term  fluctuations  arose from macroeco- 
nomic shocks (recession  and recovery in the early 1960s;  the favorable 
oil shock in 1986).  During  the past 30 years  of U. S. history,  high  inflation 
has always been accompanied  by shifting  monetary  policy, and hence 
an unstable trend. But temporary  inflation  shocks can occur at either 
high  or low inflation. 
We can use our regression  results to calculate  the effects of average 
inflation on uncertainty over various horizons. Our fitted relations 
between average inflation  and the two standard  deviations imply qua- 
dratic relations between average inflation  and the two variances. We 
first linearize  these relations  around  the sample mean of average infla- 
tion.27  We then use the parameters  of the linear  relations  to compute  the 
ratio of equation 13 to equation 12-the  percentage  increase in uncer- 
tainty per percentage  point increase in trend inflation-starting at the 
sample mean. We also compute standard  errors  for these effects. For 
the deflator,  the effect  forx = 1  is 32  percent  (t = 0.9). The  point  estimate 
implies that a 1 point rise in quarterly  trend  inflation  raises uncertainty 
about  next quarter's  inflation  by 32 percent,  but the effect is statistically 
insignificant. The effect rises to 143 percent (t =  9.2) at x  =  10 and 174 
percent (t =  8.5) at x  =  20, and approaches 221 percent (t =  6.9) as x 
approaches  infinity.  (As x approaches  infinity,  both equations 12  and 13 
approach  infinity,  but their  ratio  remains  finite.) For the CPI, the effect 
is 74 percent (t =  2.5) at x =  1. It rises to 171 percent (t =  14) at x =  20 
and 192  percent  (t =  11)  as x approaches  infinity.  For the CPI, inflation 
has statistically  significant  effects on uncertainty  at all horizons,  but the 
effects are much  larger  at long horizons. 
26. Romer  and  Romer  (1989). 
27. Alternatively,  we could  assume  a quadratic  relation  between  -*,  and  the variances 
and derive modified  versions of equations  12 and 13. In this case, we can use the exact 
relations implied by our regressions rather than linearizing  them. This approach is 
complicated,  however,  and  experimentation  shows that  the results  are  almost  the same. Laurence  Ball and Stephen G. Cecchetti  235 
Moderate-Inflation  Countries: Basic  Results 
We now extend our analysis to international  data. We begin by 
considering  the 28 countries with average quarterly  inflation  below 3 
percent. Here we estimate our basic model with CPI data; later we 
explore the effects of generalizing  the model and of using deflator  data 
where  it exists. 
We first examine the cross-country relation between inflation  and 
uncertainty.  For each country, we assume that u-.  and u, are constant 
and  estimate  them  for the entire  post-1960  period.  The top panel  of table 
5 reports  the results of regressing  the estimated  standard  deviations on 
average  inflation  for the entire  period. These results do not support  our 
hypothesis that average inflation affects u, but not u',. Instead, the 
t-statistic  for average  inflation  is 1.8 in the u-e  regression  and  3.6 in the u-, 
regression,  and  in both cases the coefficients  imply  large  effects. 
Next we examine  the relation  between inflation  and  uncertainty  over 
time. We estimate the two standard  deviations  for five-year  periods in 
each  country,  and  use the resulting  country-period  panel  data  to estimate 
the effect of average inflation on each standard deviation. In both 
regressions,  we include  country-specific  fixed  effects to isolate  the  effects 
of changes  in inflation  over time. That  is, we estimate 
(14)  Ue(i,  t)  =  c-i +  1  ri ., 
(15)  oX,(i, t)  =  'y +  81i Tit, 
where  i indexes countries,  t indexes periods,  and ri, is average  inflation 
for country  i in period t. The middle  panel of table 5 reports  regression 
results  similar  to the U.S. results  reported  above. The effect of average 
inflation  on uE  is both statistically  and economically significant,  while 
the effect on u-,  is small  and statistically  insignificant. 
Thus  the relation  between  inflation  and  uncertainty  is different  across 
countries  and  over time. A relatively  high-inflation  country  like Greece 
experiences  both greater  instability  in trend inflation  (a higher  oE)  and 
greater fluctuations  around trend (a higher u,)  than a low-inflation 
country  like  West  Germany.  For a given country,  a rise in trend  inflation 
from one period to the next makes the trend less stable but does not 
affect  fluctuations  around  the trend.  We do not have a clear  explanation 236  Brookings  Papers  on  Economic  Activity,  1:1990 
Table 5.  Effects of Average Inflation on the Standard Deviations of Permanent 




Dependent  variable  inflation  R2 
Full sample  cross-section 
Permanent shock  (a)  0.295  0.250 
(1.84) 
Temporary shock (v,,)  0.530  0.187 
(3.64) 
Subperiods  with country fixed  effects 
Permanent shock  (a)  0.208  0.325 
(5.58) 
Temporary shock  (v,,)  0.032  0.005 
(0.74) 
Subperiods  with country fixed  effects  and time dummies 
Permanent shock  (a)  0.257  0.440 
(5.81) 
Temporary shock  (v,,)  0.125  0.155 
(1.91) 
Sources:  IMF, Internationial Finianicial  Statistics;  OECD, Maini Ecotionmic  Indicators.  Numbers in parentheses  are 
t-statistics. 
for the difference between our cross-country and cross-time results; 
future  research  might  investigate  this issue. 
We can again  use our estimates to calculate  the percentage  increase 
in uncertainty  from  a 1 point  increase  in average  inflation,  starting  at the 
sample mean. The effect is 17 percent (t =  2.4) at x =  1. The effect rises 
to 88 percent (t = 6. 1) atx  = 20 and 130 percent (t = 5.6) as x approaches 
infinity.  Thus average  inflation  has little effect on short-run  uncertainty 
but  large  effects on long-run  uncertainty.  The differences  between short- 
run  and  long-run  effects are  more  dramatic  than  for U.S. CPI  data  alone. 
Moderate-Inflation  Countries: Robustness 
We check the robustness  of these results along several dimensions. 
Generally  the results  do not change.  The main  exception  is that  modeling 
inflation  as a stationary  process changes our results about uncertainty 
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We first  estimate  our equations  with fixed effects for time periods  as 
well as countries; that is,  we  add dummy variables for periods to 
equations  14 and 15. Our  basic panel results could be driven  by one or 
two events, such as the supply shocks of the 1970s, that had similar 
effects on inflation  in many  countries.28  By including  time dummies,  we 
isolate  the effects of idiosyncratic  changes  in inflation  in  the 28  countries. 
As shown in the bottom of table 5, including  these dummies  has little 
effect on the coefficients  on average  inflation.  In the same spirit,  we also 
estimate  equations  14 and 15 separately  for the 1960s, 1970s,  and 1980s 
(each decade has two observations per country). For both equations, 
we cannot  reject the hypothesis that the average  inflation  coefficient  is 
constant  across decades.29 
We also relax the assumption  that the temporary  shock  t is white 
noise in all countries. For each country, we test our MA(1) model for 
&,ut  against  the ARMA(1,1)  model that arises when -q,  is AR(1). For 3 
out of 28 countries,  a likelihood  ratio  test rejects  the MA(1)  model  at the 
5 percent level. For these countries, we assume that  t is AR(1) and 
estimate  uE  and  u, with a generalization  of our  basic procedure.  We then 
repeat our cross-country and cross-time regressions using the new 
standard  deviations  for the three  countries.  Not surprisingly,  the results 
are almost  identical  to those in table 5. 
Next, we consider  the possibility  that  trend  inflation  follows a highly 
persistent  but stationary  process. We assume that *,r  is AR(1), so our 
model  becomes 
(16)  ' 
1*  =  L +  P*t-  I  +  Et, 
28. Taylor  (1981)  suggests that the supply shocks of the 1970s  raised both average 
inflation  and  variability. 
29. We  also reestimate  equations  14  and 15  for the whole sample  using  inflation  at the 
start of a period  rather  than average  inflation  over the entire period  as the independent 
variable.  (More  precisely,  we use inflation  over the first  two quarters  of the period  and  the 
last two quarters  of the previous  period.)  Panel  members  have suggested  that outbreaks 
of inflation  in certain  periods  may  cause average  inflation  and r. to move together  even if 
the level of inflation  does not affect uncertainty.  Using start-of-period  inflation  reveals 
whether  high inflation  at a point in time implies greater  uncertainty  about the future. 
Empirically,  the distinction  proves unimportant.  Using start-of-period  inflation  in equa- 
tions 14  and  15  produces  coefficients  of 0. 10  (t  =  2.8) for  a, and - 0.02  (t  =  0.5) for o,. 238  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1990 
where E and -q,  are white noise. In this case, the level of inflation  -r, 
follows an ARMA(1, 1); estimating  this process allows us to work back 
to equation 16. For almost all countries,  estimates of p range  from 0.90 
to 0.99. To measure  the inflation-uncertainty  relation, we impose p = 
0.95  for  all  countries  and  periods  and  estimate  oE  and  u',.  Panel  regressions 
of the standard  deviations  on average  inflation  yield coefficients  of 0. 170 
(t = 4.3) foroTE  and  0.034  (t =  1.1)  for  u',. These results  are  close to those 
in the middle  panel  of table 5. 
For our stationary  model, we combine the regression results with 
generalizations  of equations  12  and 13  to estimate  the effects of inflation 
on uncertainty at various horizons. For short and moderately long 
horizons, the results are similar  to those for our basic model. As the 
horizon  becomes very long, however, the effects peak and then decline 
rather  than  rising  monotonically.  A 1  point  rise in average  inflation  raises 
uncertainty  by 16  percent  at  x = 1, by 36  percent  at x = 10,  by 29 percent 
at x = 20, and  by only 8 percent  at x = 50. This hump  shape  is similar  to 
the correlations  between ut  and (Ut+"  -  X,)2  in figure 1. These results 
should be interpreted  cautiously, however, because it is difficult to 
distinguish between our stationary and nonstationary models. The 
effects of inflation  on uncertainty  clearly  rise as we move from short  to 
moderately  long horizons, but we cannot draw firm  conclusions about 
very long horizons. 
Finally, for our basic model, table 6 reports results for data on 
deflators.  The cross-country  results, which are based on nine observa- 
tions, are  inconclusive.30  Panel  results  with  country-specific  fixed  effects 
are quite similar  to the corresponding  results  for the CPI. 
High-Inflation  Countries 
We now consider our full sample of 40 countries, which includes 6 
countries  with average  quarterly  inflation  above 10  percent.  In principle, 
the inflation-uncertainty  relation could be quite different  in high- and 
moderate-inflation  countries,  because inflation  in the former  depends  on 
factors  that  are  unimportant  in the latter,  such as the need for seignorage 
30. The coefficients  on inflation  in the deflator  regressions  are smaller  than those in 
the CPI  regressions.  But when we restrict  the CPI  sample  to the nine  countries  for which 
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Table  6. Effects  of Average  Inflation  on the Standard  Deviations  of Permanent 
and Temporary  Shocks,  GNP  Deflator,  Nine Countries,  1960:2-1989:1 
Coefficient 
on average 
Dependent  variable  inflation  R2 
Full sample cross-section 
Permanent shock  (a)  0.127  0.204 
(1.67) 
Temporary  shock (v,,)  0.137  0.073 
(1.02) 
Subperiods  with country  fixed effects 
Permanent  shock (a)  0.222  0.503 
(4.74) 
Temporary  shock (v,,)  0.059  0.035 
(1.23) 
Subperiods  with countiy  fixed effects and time dummies 
Permanent  shock (a)  0.200  0.583 
(3.30) 
Temporary  shock (v,,)  0.046  0.273 
(0.76) 
Source:  OECD,  Main Economic  Indicators.  GDP deflator is used for Australia,  France,  Great Britain, Italy, and 
Switzerland.  Numbers  in parentheses  are t-statistics. 
revenue. We find, however, that the qualitative relations between 
inflation  and  uncertainty  are similar. 
Table  7 reports  our basic cross-country  and panel  regressions  for the 
full  sample.  Across countries,  average  inflation  again  has a sizable  effect 
on both  uS and u,. In the cross-time  regressions,  average  inflation  has a 
large  effect on UE. The effect on u. now borders  on statistical  significance 
(t  =  1.6 without time dummies,  t  =  2.3 with time dummies),  but the 
coefficient is small. Results for the 12 high-inflation  countries alone, 
which  are  reported  in table  8, are  similar  to the results  for  all  40 countries. 
In high-inflation  countries,  a rise in inflation  over time  raises  both  Se  and 
U., but  the effect on u, is weak. 
The effects of average inflation  on Se  are somewhat larger  for high- 
inflation  countries  than for moderate-inflation  countries;  for example, 
the coefficients  in the middle  panels of tables 8 and 5 are 0.39 and 0.21, 
respectively. Since these results suggest some nonlinearity, we add 
average inflation squared to our equations for the full sample. The 
squared  terms appear  to belong in the panel regressions  but not in the 
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Table 7.  Effects of Average Inflation on the Standard Deviations of Permanent 
and Temporary Shocks, Consumer Price Index, Full Sample,  1960:2-1989:1 
Coefficient 
on average 
Dependent  variable  inflation  R2 
Full sample  cross-sectiona 
Permanent shock  (a)  0.395  0.869 
(7.21) 
Temporary shock  (v,,)  0.501  0.705 
(4.38) 
Subperiods  with country fixed  effects 
Permanent shock  (r,)  0.382  0.798 
(11.94) 
Temporary shock  (an)  0.092  0.054 
(1.59) 
Subperiods  with country fixed  effects  and time dummies 
Permanent shock  (a)  0.399  0.832 
(12.98) 
Temporary shock  (rfn)  0.131  0.112 
(2.28) 
Sources:  IMF, Internzational  Finianicial  Statistics;  OECD,  Main Econiomic Indicators.  Numbers in parentheses  are 
t-statistics. 
a.  Full  sample  cross-section  regressions  exclude  Bolivia.  Panel  regressions  exclude  period  including  1985-86 
Bolivian hyperinflation. 
coefficients  on average  inflation  and  its square  are 0.22 and  0.005. These 
results imply that a 1 point rise in average inflation  raises uS by 0.23 if 
the average  is initially  1  percent, and  by 0.37 if the average  is initially  15 
percent.  Thus the effect of inflation  on uncertainty  becomes somewhat 
stronger  as inflation  rises. 
Extensions 
In the next two sections we report  on extensions of our  basic analysis 
that  test the robustness  of our results. 
An Alternative Measure  of Core Inflation 
Our  central  finding  is that a higher  trend rate of inflation  raises the 
variance  of the trend  but not the variance  of deviations  from  trend.  This 
finding  depends,  of course, on our method  for decomposing  movements 
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Table  8. Effects  of Average  Inflation  on the Standard  Deviations  of Permanent 




Dependent  variable  inflation  R2 
Full sample cross-sectiona 
Permanent  shock (a)  0.420  0.805 
(6.39) 
Temporary  shock (v,,)  0.507  0.568 
(3.61) 
Subperiods  with countr-y  fixed effects 
Permanent  shock (a)  0.389  0.820 
(11.79) 
Temporary  shock (v,,)  0.094  0.058 
(1.57) 
Suibperiods  with countly  fixed effects and time dummies 
Permanent shock  (ok)  0.418  0.866 
(13.74) 
Temporary  shock (v,,)  0.197  0.204 
(2.88) 
Sources:  IMF, Initernzationial  Finanicial Statistics;  OECD, Maini  Econiomizic  Itndicators. Numbers in parentheses  are 
t-statistics. 
a.  Full  sample  cross-section  regressions  exclude  Bolivia.  Panel  regressions  exclude  period  including  1985-86 
Bolivian hyperinflation. 
completely different  approach  to this decomposition. Following Alan 
Blinder  and others, we define core inflation  as the CPI excluding  food 
and energy.3"  The idea behind  this definition  is that movements  in food 
and  energy  prices  largely  reflect  transitory  effects of weather  and  OPEC 
decisions, so that excluding them provides an inflation  measure that 
more  nearly  reflects  the trend. 
We now test our basic hypothesis about trend and deviations using 
this direct  measure  of core inflation.  Let 
(17)  m= ,Tt  F 
(18)  ~ ~  ~  ~  E  ,=  Wc  -  '7c_ 
where  wrrc  is core inflation.  The variables  &  and ft are our new measures 
of changes  in trend  inflation  and  deviations  from  trend. We estimate 
31. See Blinder  (1982).  Journalists  often report  the CPI  excluding  food and  energy  as 
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(19)  I 'J  =  %o  + 
, Trc  +  u1 
(20)  E't =  o  +  PB  'rr +  u2t. 
That  is, we estimate  the effects of core inflation  on the absolute sizes of 
the two shocks. For quarterly  U.S. data for 1960-88, the estimates of 
13 and 8, with t-statistics  using Newey-West standard  errors  are 0.206 
(t =  3.9) and  0.019 (t =  1.2).32  A rise in core inflation  has a sizable  effect 
on fluctuations  in the trend  and  a small  effect on deviations.  These results 
confirm  the message of the previous  section.33 
Variability and  Uncertainty 
As discussed above, Fischer and others emphasize the distinction 
between inflation  variability  and inflation  uncertainty.  It is possible that 
when inflation  is high  it varies  considerably,  but  that  the movements  are 
largely predictable, so the variance of unanticipated  inflation is not 
especially  large.  In our  model,  this distinction  is unimportant:  for a given 
horizon, the variances  of the change in inflation  and the unanticipated 
change are similar  (see equations 8 and 9). A major  limitation  of our 
model, however, is that it is univariate. When inflation is high, its 
movements might be unpredictable  in a univariate  model, but largely 
predictable  based  on other  variables.  If, for  example,  inflation  variability 
arises from  unstable  monetary  policy, lagged  money growth  could have 
considerable predictive power. Engle measures uncertainty with a 
multivariate  model. Could this help explain why he finds no effect of 
inflation  on uncertainty? 
In  principle,  one could  estimate  a multivariate  version  of our  statistical 
model. In such a framework,  both temporary  and  permanent  changes  in 
inflation  would depend on lagged values of observable variables. This 
approach  is difficult,  however, and  so we take a simpler  one. We extend 
our  preliminary  calculations  of correlations  between  the level of inflation 
and squared changes at various horizons. Here, we first regress the 
change  from t to t + x on a vector of variables  known  at t: 
32. A direct  measure  of core inflation  is available  only for the United  States. We use 
the technique  of Newey and  West  (1987)  with  five lags. 
33. The sample variances of i,  and Et  are 0.080 and 0.336, respectively. In our 
unobserved  components  model, r2 exceeds  U2. These results suggest  that the food and 
energy  shocks  captured  by i, are  only part  of the temporary  fluctuations  in inflation. Laurence Ball and Stephen  G. Cecchetti  243 
Table 9.  Correlations of Inflation with Squared Change and Squared Unanticipated 
Change in Inflation, United States,  1954-89 
Correlation 
GNP deflator  CPI 
Horizon  in  Unanticipated  Actual  Unanticipated  Actual 
quarters  (x)  changea  changeb  changea  changeb 
1  0.148  0.086  0.192  0.213 
2  0.164  0.134  0.335  0.395 
3  0.151  0.121  0.217  0.333 
4  0.169  0.192  0.298  0.376 
5  0.274  0.357  0.295  0.412 
6  0.220  0.313  0.256  0.405 
7  0.177  0.304  0.353  0.439 
8  0.182  0.344  0.311  0.447 
9  0.105  0.207  0.266  0.410 
10  0.172  0.303  0.319  0.422 
12  0.259  0.366  0.408  0.470 
14  0.403  0.416  0.485  0.530 
16  0.287  0.282  0.456  0.491 
18  0.322  0.323  0.588  0.602 
20  0.339  0.355  0.560  0.572 
24  0.361  0.211  0.600  0.514 
28  0.247  0.133  0.469  0.396 
32  0.256  0.197  0.380  0.383 
36  0.267  0.201  0.365  0.279 
40  0.249  0.055  0.324  0.162 
44  0.297  - 0.005  0.440  0.127 
48  0.282  -0.071  0.423  0.153 
50  0.326  -0.045  0.311  0.016 
Source:  Citibase.  Quarterly  data, seasonally  adjusted,  for implicit  GNP deflator  and  CPI-U  for all items. 
a. Correlation  of inflation  with  the square  of the residual  from  equation  21 in the text. 
b. Correlation  of inflation  with  the square  of the actual  change  in inflation.  Also shown  in table  2. 
(21)  1Tt+x  -  =t =  Zty.,y +  ex, 
where  Zt is information  available  at t and yx  is a vector of coefficients. 
The  residuals  from  this  regression,  ex  ,, capture  the unanticipatedchange 
in inflation-the part not predictable  from the Z's. We measure the 
relation  between  inflation  and  uncertainty  by the correlation  between  7Ft 
and  the squared  residuals. 
For U.S. data for 1954-89, table 9 reports results when Z includes 
four  lags of each of three variables:  the change in inflation,  the change 
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changes  in wage growth  and  changes  in import  price  inflation,  both used 
by Engle.) The table compares the correlations between wr,  and the 
squared  residuals  from  equation  21 with the correlations  between  -r,  and 
the squared  change in inflation,  which were presented in table 2. The 
results are quite similar:  the level of inflation  has similar  effects on the 
size of changes and  the size of unanticipated  changes. The results  again 
show the importance of horizons, and suggest that the uncertainty- 
variability  distinction  is not important.34 
Conclusion 
This paper  investigates  the relation  between inflation  and  uncertainty 
at short and long horizons. We decompose movements  in inflation  into 
shifts  in  trend  inflation  and  temporary  deviations  from  trend.  Uncertainty 
about next quarter's  inflation  depends mainly  on the variance  of devia- 
tions, while uncertainty about inflation over several years depends 
mainly on the variance  of the trend. We find that a rise in the level of 
inflation  has little effect on the variance of deviations, but makes the 
trend  considerably  less stable. Thus  inflation  has much  larger  effects on 
uncertainty  at long horizons. 
Because trend  inflation  is determined  by monetary  policy, our  results 
suggest that high  inflation  makes policy less stable. This conclusion fits 
the U.S.  experience during the  1970s. Fearing unemployment, the 
Federal  Reserve initially  accommodated  the oil and  food shocks of 1973, 
but the alarming  rise in inflation  led to tighter  policy in 1974. Inflation 
dropped,  but the deep recession of 1975  produced  another  loosening of 
policy. A similar  pattern  of accommodation  and then reversal  followed 
the supply shocks of the late 1970s. As Okun predicted in 1971, high 
inflation  led to 'stop-go'  policies. In contrast,  the relatively  low inflation 
of the 1980s  has produced  steady  policy aimed  at keeping  inflation  low.35 
Our  finding  that  high  inflation  raises long-run  uncertainty  implies  that 
34. The R2's  from  estimating  equation  21 are substantial.  For the CPI, the R2  is 0.42 
for  x =  1, 0.33 for  x =  10, and  0.16 for  x = 40. Thus  variables  such  as money  growth  and 
output  do help forecast inflation.  But variability  in the unforecastable  part  has a similar 
relation  to the level of inflation  as total  variability. 
35. For the history  of inflation  in the 1970s,  see Blinder  (1982)  and  Romer  and  Romer 
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inflation  has substantial  costs. Two costs of unstable  trend  inflation  are 
perhaps most important.  First, as emphasized by Milton Friedman, 
uncertainty  creates risk for individuals  with nominal  contracts such as 
loans, pensions, and labor contracts. This risk reduces the efficiency 
gains from these arrangements  and individuals' willingness to enter 
them. Second, the stop-go monetary policy that produces unstable 
inflation  also produces  unstable  output.  Policy swings that  create  reces- 
sions, such as the drastic tightening  in 1979, are usually a reaction to 
high  inflation. 
A possible policy implication  is that  the Federal  Reserve should  fight 
inflation.  If OPEC  III occurs this year, Alan Greenspan  should realize 
that accommodating  it will lead not only to a high level of inflation  but 
also to costly uncertainty.  Of course, failing  to accommodate  the shock 
will lead to high unemployment,  which is also costly. As Okun  empha- 
sized, there  is no easy solution  to the output-inflation  trade-off. 
On the other  hand, our results suggest  that the trade-off  can be made 
somewhat  less painful.  Because costly uncertainty  arises from  unstable 
policy, the Federal  Reserve can reduce  the costs by making  policy more 
stable. If Alan  Greenspan  does accommodate  OPEC  III, then he and  his 
successors should avoid a stop-go reaction  to the resulting  inflation.  It 
might  be desirable,  for example, to make  a well-publicized  commitment 
to gradual  disinflation.  Such commitments  are most important  at high 
inflation,  where our results suggest that the danger  of unstable  policy is 
greatest.  At low inflation,  policy tends naturally  to be stable  even under 
discretion.36 
36. Our  discussant  takes  this  point  a step  further  and  suggests  that  the Federal  Reserve 
simply  stabilize  inflation  at its current  level rather  than  disinflate.  With  a firm  commitment 
to stability,  the costs of inflation  might  be small.  We find  this idea interesting,  but we are 
skeptical.  Our  empirical  results  are  robust:  across  a wide variety  of countries  and  periods, 
higher  trend  inflation  is almost  always  accompanied  by greater  variation  in the trend.  High 
but  steady  inflation  may  be possible  in theory,  but  it is very rare  in practice.  Why  is it hard 
to stabilize  inflation  at a high level? Okun  and Fischer and Summers  (1989)  argue  that 
inflationary  expectations  rise considerably  if the public  believes that  the Federal  Reserve 
has  given  up  the  fight  against  inflation.  The  Federal  Reserve  must  then  accommodate  these 
expectations  to avoid a recession;  the result  is not stable inflation  but a rise to a higher 
level. Another  complication  is that  a Federal  Reserve  decision  to live with  inflation  could 
be thwarted  by pressure  from politicians  or Wall Street. High inflation  creates political 
controversy,  and  political  controversy  produces  stop-go  policies. (Imagine  the reaction  if 
Paul  Volcker  had  announced  in 1979  that  he would  accept  double-digit  inflation  forever.) Comments 
and Discussion 
Robert J.  Gordon: Laurence Ball and Stephen Cecchetti present a 
technically sophisticated  treatment  of an old and familiar  question, the 
relationship  between the mean rate of inflation  and the variability  of 
inflation. Before dipping into the core of the paper, with its many 
excellent ideas and details of execution, let's step back and review the 
basic policy dilemma  that  motivates  the entire  enterprise. 
Today, as at the first meeting of the Brookings Panel in 1970, the 
inflation  rate is about 5 percent. The policymaker  would prefer zero 
inflation,  but is presented  with extremely convincing  research  that the 
economy is subject  to a non-zero  sacrifice  ratio, that is, the percentage 
of one year's real GNP that must be sacrificed  permanently  to reduce 
inflation  by 1 percentage  point. The sacrifice  ratio  for the disinflation  of 
the 1980s  was predicted  in advance to be about six, and indeed turned 
out to be almost exactly that.1 Most people now agree that losing 6 
percent of a year's GNP is almost entirely a true loss, with little offset 
from  an increased  value of leisure. 
But  there  is wide disagreement  about  what, if any, gain  society enjoys 
from  a 1 point permanent  reduction  of the inflation  rate. The traditional 
money-triangle  analysis always yielded low numbers. This approach 
yields an even smaller  benefit  of reduced  inflation  now, as the fraction 
of the money supply  paying  interest  is much  higher  than  it was 10 years 
ago, and  the monetary  base that  pays no interest  has fallen  to less than  6 
percent of GNP. The inadequacy  of the money-triangle  approach  has 
long been summed up by saying that "it takes a heap of Harberger 
1. Gordon  and  King  (1982,  table  5, line 3). Reasons  for preferring  the line 3 variant  are 
given on pp. 236-37. 
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triangles  to fill an Okun gap." This recognition set the opponents of 
inflation  off on a different  tack in their  search  for its welfare  costs. 
Ironically  it was Arthur  Okun  himself, the father  of the gap, who has 
the earliest  cited article  on the Ball-Cecchetti  reference  list, making  the 
point  that  there  is a positive correlation  between the mean  and variance 
of inflation.  The implication  is that the main  welfare cost of high mean 
inflation  is a high  variance  of inflation,  with all the classic redistribution 
among  creditors  and debtors that occurs with a variable  inflation  rate. 
In 1971  I wrote a short  BPEA report  that accepted Okun's  premise  but 
disputed  his empirical  results as being dependent  on the inclusion of a 
few high-inflation  countries.  Today  Ball  and  Cecchetti,  with  two decades 
of evidence and  better  techniques, support  Okun  in that debate. 
So let me accept that  there  is a positive  relationship  between  the mean 
and variance  even for moderate-inflation  countries and instead offer a 
deeper objection to this line of research:  it is simply irrelevant  to the 
policy problem  of assessing the trade-off  between the social costs and 
benefits  of disinflation.  As the authors  recognize, too late, in their last 
paragraph,  "Because costly uncertainty  arises  from  unstable  policy, the 
Federal  Reserve can reduce the costs by making  policy more stable." 
In short, all the research in this area, including  the present paper, is 
subject  to the Lucas critique.  Any finding  that  the mean  and variance  of 
inflation  were related in the past, because policymakers decided to 
bring  inflation  down, is valid only for a policy regime in which policy- 
makers choose disinflation. Parameters estimated from this regime 
cannot be expected to apply to a new regime in which policymakers 
choose not to disinflate.  From  the standpoint  of individual  agents, they 
may have been right  to fear the "big bad wolf," that is, the threat  that 
the central  bank  will bring  inflation  to an end. But this fear is irrelevant 
to the central  bank's choice today whether  to be a "big bad wolf" or a 
"big  good wolf." 
This  inherent  flaw  in  the mean-variance  inflation  welfare  cost literature 
reflects  the total absence of consideration  of a policy regime  favored by 
many  people in this room, that is, targeting  nominal  GNP growth to a 
path  consistent  with steady inflation.  My standard  policy recommenda- 
tion for an economy operating near its natural level of output and 
unemployment  is to target  nominal  GNP growth  as the sum of inherited 
core inflation  plus the growth  rate of natural  or potential  real GNP; that 248  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1990 
gives us a nominal  GNP target  growth  rate  for the United States now of 
about 7 percent, which would ratify 4.5 percent inflation  forever. The 
effects of any future adverse supply shocks would be automatically 
divided  between temporary  extra  inflation  and  a temporary  output  loss, 
but  there  will  be no permanent  divergence  of inflation  from  its 4.5 percent 
path, unless the growth  rate of natural  real GNP changes permanently. 
Am I deterred  from  endowing  the economy  with  a permanent  4.5 percent 
inflation  by Ball and Cecchetti's evidence that in the past the mean  and 
variance of inflation  have been correlated  even for moderate-inflation 
countries?  No, because their sample  does not consist of countries  that 
have successfully stabilized  nominal  GNP  growth  (as far  as I know there 
are no such countries). 
The authors  attempt  to deal with this criticism  in their  footnote 36 by 
speculating why there are no examples of nations that successfully 
"stabilized  inflation  at a high  level." Their  response makes  no mention 
of my main point, which is the feasibility of stabilizing  nominal  GNP 
growth at a rate that ratifies  the current  rate of core inflation.  Such a 
policy recommendation  may not have occurred  to policymakers  in the 
past, accounting  for their  empirical  results, but this does not rule  out the 
virtues  of the recommendation  to current  and  future  policymakers.  Two 
dangers  in attempting  to live with  ongoing  inflation  offered  by the authors 
are, first, a spontaneous  jump in the expected rate of inflation  if people 
realize that "the Federal  Reserve has given up the fight," and, second, 
political pressure to reduce inflation. These reasons are particularly 
unconvincing  for the United States, where the strong  role of inertia  in 
the inflation  process makes expectations  backward  looking. Regarding 
the first  point, there is no evidence for the postwar  period  from survey 
evidence that there were any episodes of  spontaneous changes in 
inflationary  expectations relative  to econometric  estimates of the influ- 
ence of lagged inflation;  such spontaneous  jumps would be especially 
unlikely in an environment of stable and predictable nominal GNP 
growth. If such a jump did occur, it would be self-cancelling,  since any 
effect in raising  inflation  would automatically  reduce  real GNP growth, 
setting in motion the process by which inflation  is brought  back down. 
Regarding  the second point, high inflation  may create political contro- 
versy, but so does the high unemployment  needed to reduce inflation. 
The 1979-82 episode provides little guidance now, as it combines not 
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The political  controversy  of that period  reflects the devastating  loss of 
jobs, particularly  in manufacturing,  as much  as any unambiguous  polit- 
ical verdict  on high  steady core inflation. 
Chastened  by the recognition  that  the econometric  results  in the paper 
are  irrelevant  to the main  question  that  motivates  the enterprise,  we can 
now turn  to the details of implementation.  Within  the framework  of the 
mean-variance  literature,  the paper  attempts  to reconcile two pieces of 
conflicting  evidence, the evidence dating  from  Okun  and  various  follow- 
up papers  that there is a strong  positive relation  between the mean and 
variance  in a cross-section of countries, and the conflicting  evidence 
presented  by Engle in 1983  that the variance  of unanticipated  shocks to 
inflation  is uncorrelated  with the current  level of inflation.  The authors 
consider two explanations. Fischer suggests that high inflation  raises 
inflation  variability  but not inflation  uncertainty.  The authors  reject  this 
interpretation  in  favor  of their  own, that  the crucial  dimension  is the time 
horizon;  the mean of inflation  can be uncorrelated  with the short-term 
high-frequency  noise in the inflation  process while still highly  correlated 
with the lower-frequency  variance  over longer  periods. 
The authors'  first  crack  at the evidence is summarized  in figure  1;  the 
correlation  between the mean  and variance  is low at one quarter,  peaks 
at 14-to-18  quarters,  and then  falls off steadily  to zero at 40 quarters  and 
beyond. The short-term  and middle-term  patterns confirm  their basic 
hypothesis, but the long-term correlation  does not. The authors  just 
describe this finding without considering its implications; they say 
''current  inflation  is uninformative  about  inflation  in the distant  future." 
But  their  finding  about  the long term  puts another  nail  in the coffin  of the 
attempt  to extract welfare implications  from mean-variance  analysis. 
Since we can't predict inflation over the long term, we are just as 
uncertain  about the future  when today's inflation  rate is low as when it 
is high,  and  thus  a reduction  in uncertainty  cannot  be claimed  as a benefit 
of any given disinflationary  policy. 
The authors'  formal  contribution  is a simple  unobserved  components 
model  containing  two shocks, one that affects inflation  temporarily  but 
not the trend  of inflation  and a second that changes trend  inflation.  The 
paper's  basic hypothesis  is that "trend  inflation  has a stronger  effect on 
[the trend shock] than on [the transitory  shock]." While this sounds 
circular,  it is not. A country with high trend inflation has a higher 
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Substantively,  such countries  are  those in which  policy has been accom- 
modative in the past and may be again, accounting for the higher 
likelihood  of increases in trend  inflation,  but also those in which the big 
bad wolf may decide to disinflate,  accounting  for the higher  likelihood 
of decreases in trend  inflation. 
Estimates of the model yield conflicting  results. In U.S. time series 
for five-year  periods  inflation  raises  uncertainty  by much  more  over long 
periods  than  over short  periods,  although  I'm not sure that  this analysis 
of five-year intervals  tells us anything  more than we learned  from the 
simple plots of figure 1, which peaked at near a five-year  horizon. The 
unobserved  components  model  is subsequently  tested directly  by taking 
the core CPI inflation  rate as a measure  of trend  inflation  and the food- 
energy effect as measures  of deviations  from trend, and the hypothesis 
is confirmed  again that a rise in core inflation  has a "sizable effect on 
fluctuations  in the trend and a small effect on deviations." But even 
aside from the good wolf-bad wolf argument,  I'm not sure that these 
results should  have much  influence  on current  policymakers.  Two very 
large  adverse  supply  shocks  made  both  the mean  and  variance  of inflation 
higher  in the 1970s  and early 1980s;  another  large  adverse supply shock 
in the future would raise both the mean and variance of inflation, 
regardless  of whether  the Federal  Reserve sets nominal  GNP growth  to 
achieve a 5 percent  inflation  path  or zero percent  inflation  path. 
The five-year  horizon  tests are repeated  for a large set of countries, 
controlling  for country-specific  fixed effects, and the U.S. results are 
confirmed.  But cross-country  tests do not confirm  the basic hypothesis; 
here  the transitory  shock  responds  more, not less, to mean  inflation  than 
the trend shock. The authors have no explanation  for this anomaly. 
Nevertheless, the cross-country  results do support the original  Okun 
finding  that  the overall  mean  and variance  are positively correlated. 
The authors  conclude that "high  inflation  makes policy less stable." 
I would  state  this very differently:  their  time-series  results  for the United 
States  show  that  large  adverse  supply  shocks  create  a dilemma  for  policy, 
and  almost  any  policy response  would  have  created  a positive  correlation 
between the mean  and variance  of inflation  in time-series  data, whether 
the economy started  out with low or high  inflation.  And, while I applaud 
the authors  for finally  recognizing  in the last paragraph  that  "the Federal 
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stable," I disagree completely with their inference that the Federal 
Reserve should "make a well-publicized  commitment  to gradual  disin- 
flation." This is a non  sequitur.  Their results contain not one shred of 
evidence that the Federal Reserve's move toward more stable policy 
should  consist of a commitment  to gradual  disinflation  as opposed to a 
commitment  to a nominal  GNP path  consistent  with steady inflation. 
General Discussion 
Much of the discussion focused on the difficulty of distinguishing 
between changes in monetary policy and exogenous shocks to other 
variables  affecting the inflation  rate. George Perry suggested an alter- 
native to the view that high trend  inflation  should  always be blamed  on 
easy monetary  policy. He found it more useful to interpret  the high 
inflation  of the seventies as coming not from Federal  Reserve misman- 
agement  but rather  from a series of bad price shocks that the Federal 
Reserve  partially  accepted  rather  than  incurring  the costs of disinflation. 
He found it difficult  to offer sensible policy recommendations  without 
any way to distinguish  between sources of inflation. 
James  Duesenberry  emphasized  the interplay  of political  constraints 
and economic goals in interpreting  episodes of inflation.  He attributed 
observed variations  in the rates of inflation  less to changing  attitudes 
about  inflation  on the part  of the Federal  Reserve than  to their  changing 
perceptions  about what the political reaction to accepting or fighting 
inflation  would be. Although  the paper  attributed  long-lasting  changes 
in  inflation  to Federal  Reserve  policy, he argued  that  policy  was generally 
accommodating  rather than active. There were only occasional inci- 
dents  when active Federal  Reserve policy had either  started  inflation  or 
stopped  it. 
Charles  Holt suggested  that  in order  to evaluate  monetary  policy, the 
model  needs to take into account not  just inflation  but all the variables 
of concern  to the Federal  Reserve, such as unemployment  and perhaps 
others  as well, and  examine  the trade-offs  among  them. But even within 
the authors'  framework  based only on inflation,  the appropriate  policy 
response  depends  on whether  a shock  is permanent  or  transitory;  optimal 
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Federal  Reserve cannot  distinguish  between permanent  and temporary 
shocks, though control theory can point to the appropriate  responses 
given the structure  estimated  by the authors'  model. 
Consistent  with the authors'  interpretation  of their  results, Lawrence 
Summers described a mechanism by which high inflation results in 
greater  inflation  uncertainty.  Summers  pointed out that when inflation 
is low, the sensible policy prescription  is to produce  more  low inflation. 
However, when inflation  is high, agents will be uncertain  whether to 
continue  to permit  high  inflation  or to take on the costs of eliminating  it. 
Ball reminded  the group  of Arthur  Okun's  observation  that it is hard  for 
a monetary authority  willing to live with a high level of inflation  to 
persuade  the public  that  it will not accept any rate  of inflation. 
Ben Bernanke  argued  that  the behavioral  model  for the high-  and  low- 
inflation  countries  would not be the same. The model suggested  for the 
low-inflation  countries  is one with an independent  central  bank that is 
choosing how to move up and down a Phillips  curve. However useful 
that model may  be for these countries,  Bernanke  felt that  inflation  in the 
high-inflation  countries  reflected  fiscal instability,  with a high inflation 
variance  reflecting  changes  in and  uncertainty  about  fiscal  policies. 
George von Furstenberg  questioned  whether  it was proper  to model 
the trend  inflation  rate  as a random  walk. While  he found  it easy to accept 
random  shocks to the price  level or to the money supply  or velocity, he 
contended  that  the inflation  rate  should  be seen as subject  to the Federal 
Reserve policy and should  therefore  not be modeled  as a random  walk. Laurence  Ball and Stephen  G. Cecchetti  253 
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